The Exploding Ford Pinto Disaster

Ford launched the Pinto in 1970. Company officials later lied under oath about this. Evidence shows Ford ran crash tests on the car and knew the safety problems before it hit the market.

Every test at 25 mph or more, on an unaltered car, resulted in the car'sfuel tank rupturingOnly three out of 11 tests before the Pinto's release showed the fuel tank did not rupture.

In those three tests, the car's structure was altered. One test used a plastic baffle between the tank and the differential housing to stop bolts from piercing the tank. Another test put steel between the tank and the rear bumper. The third test lined the fuel tank with a rubber bladder.

Ford chose not to add any of these cheap structural changes to the Pinto before selling it.

If Lee Iacocca had lost his fight with Semon "Bunky" Knudsen in the late 1960s, the Ford Pinto might never have been built.

Iacocca was a fast-rising Ford executive who argued the companywould lose the American compact market to German and Japanese car makers if Ford did not create its own alternative to the VW Beetle.Knudsen, Ford's president, accepted letting Japanese and German makers own the compact market. Ford dominated the American market for medium- and large cars, which helped Knudsen.

Knudsen, Ford's president, let Japanese and German makers control the compact market. Ford dominated the American market for medium and large cars.

Iacocca won. Knudsen resigned soon after, and Iacocca became company president. He then quickly started his plan to build a compact car that could match German and Japanese models.

Developing a car takes about 43 months, from first idea to final production. Because Iacocca wanted the Ford Pinto in showrooms with 1971 models (by fall 1970), the schedule was set for under 25 months. This development time is thought to be one of the shortest in auto history.

tooling processdesigning a tool for every car part usually starts after the part design is finished and engineers confirm all parts work together. Because the Pinto timeline was so tight, the tooling process (which usually takes about 18 months) happened during product development. The tooling was already far along by the time crash tests showed the dangerous fuel tank defect.Designing a tool for each car part usually starts after the part design is final and engineers confirm all parts work together. The Pinto's short timeline meant the tooling process, which normally takes about 18 months, happened during product development. Thus, the tooling was advanced by the time crash tests showed the dangerous fuel tank flaw.

No one told Iacocca when the defect was found. An anonymous Ford executive, who had worked as an engineer on the Pinto,Mother Jonesmagazine:

Someone who might have warned Iacocca would get fired. Ford did not focus on safety then. Lee made it taboo. When a Pinto problem caused a delay, Lee would smoke his cigar, look out the window, and say, "Read the product objectives and get back to work."

Iacocca insisted the Pinto weigh under 2,000 pounds and cost less than $2,000. These "2,000 limits" meant Ford left out the lightweight, $11 plastic part that crash tests showed stopped the fuel tank from bursting.

The initial marketing for the Pinto used this phrase:The little carefree car..

Ads showed how the Pinto let owners avoid worries about price, high gas bills, and maintenance. They tried to show the car beat similar-sized imports.

Ford put the Pinto on sale in mid-September 1970. Soon after, serious design flaws started appearing.

In late October 1970, Ford wasFord forced a recall less than two months after the 1970 release. Twenty-six thousand Pintos needed recall because a sticking accelerator caused problems.about 26,000 Pintos after people complained the accelerator stuck when the throttle went past halfway.

About five months later, the majority of Pintos required a recall. This recall fixed an issue with fuel vapors.The fuel vapors collected and exploded.under the car's hood.

Ford issued the recall for Pintos built before March 13, 1971, after getting about 100 explosion reports. Damage included broken air cleaners and significant charring on the front end. A Ford spokesperson stated none of these fires reached the passenger compartment, and no injuries were reported.

But the worst Pinto problems remained hidden.

In 1973, Ford's recall office started getting reports of Pintos catching fire in low-speed rear-end crashes. Dennis Gioia headed the recall office then.

"I started the file on the Pinto fires, and it never grew big," GioiaFord recalled the car to fix the issue.Corporate Crime Reporterin 2016. "I expect 25 to 50 reports before I suggest recalling a car. The Pinto file had fewer than five reports."

Gioia started thinking a major car issue existed after seeing a burnt Pinto returned from an accident. He told his coworkers to recommend Ford recall all Pintos.

When the recommendation came up for discussion, they asked him, "What evidence do I have?" he said. "How many cases support a recall recommendation? I had to admit I had nothing."

The recall office voted for a second recommendation for the Pintos after Gioia saw the "Pinto memo." The memo showed engineers found a dangerous flaw in the fuel tank system during crash tests on the car, before the first model sold.

Ford made the second recall recommendation in 1974. But when it reached the executive committee, word arrived that Ford ran crash tests on the Pinto and its rivals, so Gioia's office did nothing until tests finished.

Gioia explained the recommendation to recall ended up being rejected.""During the competitive crash tests, they claimed the Pinto was no worse than the competition.

Experts do not know the exact number of people who died from the Pinto rear-end explosions. Estimates run from 27 (the official total) to180 people died in these explosions.upwards of500 people perished in these explosions.. Also, nobody knows how many other people got hurt in these accidents.

Regardless of the number, the Pinto gained a reputation as one of the world's most dangerous cars.

Over 100 lawsuits targeted Ford regarding Pinto rear-end accidents. The two most famous cases areGrimshaw sued the Ford Motor Company.(1978) andThe State of Indiana sued the Ford Motor Company.(1979).

The first case involved a 1972 accident. A Pinto was rear-ended after stalling on a California highway. The crash impact reached 35 mph. Trial evidence showed the car's bad welding punctured the fuel tank on impact, causing the fuel to ignite and leak into the passenger area.

The driver, Lily Gray, died of heart failure from severe burns. A 13-year-old passenger, Richard Grimshaw, suffered disfiguring burns. After more than 50 surgeries, he lost his left ear and part of his left hand's fingers.

An Orange County Superior Court jury gave Grimshaw an award.$125 millionplus $2.841 million in compensatory damages. Gray's family received $665,000 in compensatory damages. This was the biggest jury award against an automaker until a $150 million verdict occurred inHardy sued General Motors.(1996).

The judge cut the punitive damages award down to $3.5 million.

Meanwhile, inThe State of Indiana sued the Ford Motor Company., a grand jury charged Ford with reckless homicide. Three teenaged girls died when their 1973 Pinto was rear-ended by another driver while stopped in the middle of a road. It was theThese accidents led to major legal cases.This happened in time.A US corporation faced criminal charges for a defective product. This was the first time a US corporation faced homicide charges.

Ford faced a $30,000 fine if convicted. After a ten-week trial, the jury returned a verdict.not guilty" on all three counts.

A copy of the "Pinto memo" appeared in 1977, obtained by Mother Jonesa magazine known for investigative reporting), this internal report circulated among senior Ford executives years earlier. It showed Ford ran a cost analysis. The analysis concluded fixing the car would cost the company less money.cheaper for the companyFord could pay out settlements to crash victims instead of recalling and fixing the cars.

The memo claimed safety modifications to the Pinto's fuel tank cost $11 per car. Based on 11 million sales, the total cost hit $121 million.

With 2,100 accidents, settling lawsuits out of court cost Ford "just" $49.53 million. This broke down to $36 million for those burned to death (180 deaths times $200,000 settlement), $12.06 million for those with serious burns (180 times $67,000 payout), and $1.47 million for the burned-out cars (2,100 times $700 cost).

The Center for Auto Safety asked the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in April 1974 to recall Ford Pintos to check defects in the fuel system design.

The Center for Auto Safety filed the petition after receiving reports of three deaths and several other serious injuries from rear-end collisions at moderate speeds.

The NHTSA did not push for a recall. The agency stated there was not enough evidenceto justify a recall.

An article titled "Pinto Madness" appeared in the September/October 1977 issue of Mother Jonesmagazine. The article made several claims against the Ford Motor Co. It alleged the company knew the Pinto was a "firetrap" before public release but refused design changes due to expected costs.

One day after the article dropped, the Center for Auto Safety resubmitted its petitionto the NHTSA to recall the Pintos.

The NHTSA started an investigation on August 11, 1977. On May 8, 1978, the agency told Ford the investigation found the Pinto's fuel system was defective.

A public hearing was set for the next month. Before that hearing, Ford announced a "voluntary" recall. They recalled about 1.5 million 1971-1976 model Pintos and 1975-1976 model Mercury Bobcats, excluding station wagons. The Mercury Bobcat models got recalled because, even though no reports of fuel tank fires reached the NHTSA, that car used the same fuel system as the Pinto.

When Ford announced the recall, Vice President Herbert L. Misch released a statement.Misch released a prepared statement.That statement read in part,

Ford informed NHTSA it disagreed with the agency's May 8 determination that the car design involved an unreasonable safety risk.

Misch's statement continued, saying the company decided to offer modifications to the cars to stop public worry caused by criticism of the fuel systems.

This recall was one of the largest in U.S. automotive history. A Ford spokesperson stated at the time the recall was announced that making the necessary design changes would cost the company $20 to $30 per car, equaling about $45 million if every recalled car needed repairs.

During early Pinto planning, Ford engineers considered using the same fuel tank they used in the Capri.They considered the same type of gas tank.Ford engineers considered using the same fuel tank as the Ford Capri. Ford eventually placed the tank in the Pinto six inches ahead of the rear bumper.

The Ford Capri's fuel tank sat over the rear axle and differential housing. Ford showed this tank was safe in crash tests; it withstood rear-end impacts up to 60 mph in its Experimental Safety Vehicle.

Despite this, Ford chose not to use the Capri fuel tank in the Pinto.

Safety regulations for car design specifications were not as strict or specific in the 1960s and '70s as they are now.

The first federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for fuel system integrity started January 1, 1968. This standard only required passenger cars to pass a 30 mph fixed front-barrier crash test. Because there were no similar rear or side crash test requirements,there was no requirement for a passenger car to pass a rear or side crash test.This allowed Ford to claim the Pinto met the required standards for fuel system safety.

NHTSA proposed expanding that first standard to include rear-end collisions. It first suggested a 20 mph moving-barrier rear-impact test—a proposal Ford publicly backed. But when NHTSA suggested a stricter 20 mph fixed-barrier standard and announced a long-term goal of a 30 mph fixed-barrier standard, Ford and other car makers filed objections and started a lobbying effort that delayed these stricter standards.

The 1977 models introduced requirements for passenger cars to pass a 30 mph rear moving-barrier test and a 20 mph side moving-barrier test. Light trucks and vans lacked these safety rules until the next year's models arrived.

The number of people burned in rear-end collisions gave the Pinto a reputation as a "firetrap."

In 1991, Gary T. Schwartz, a former UCLA law professor, wrote an article rejecting that idea. The article appeared in the Rutgers Law Review.Rutgers Law ReviewThe article used statistics showing the Ford Pinto's overall fatality rate was comparable to other subcompact and compact cars on the road in the mid-1970s.The overall fatality rate of the Ford Pinto was comparable to the rates of other subcompact and compact cars that were on the road in the mid-1970s.The overall fatality rate of the Ford Pinto was comparable to the rates of other subcompact and compact cars that were on the road in the mid-1970s.

In 1975-'76, only 4% of U.S. fatal car crashes involved fire. Fifteen percent of those deadly, fire-related crashes resulted from rear-end collisions. During this period, Pintos represented 1.9% of cars on U.S. roads and 1.9% of fatal crashes involving fire.

The Pinto's overall fatality rate matched other subcompact or compact cars like the AMC Gremlin, Chevrolet Vega, and Datsun 510. This rate was much better than that of the VW Beetle or Toyota Corolla. The Pinto's fire safety record was average for a compact car.

Schwartz found the Pinto's fire-related deaths from rear-end collisions were much worse than the average subcompact during that time. However, he thought this accident type was too narrow to call the car a "firetrap."

The 1980 model was the final Pinto Ford released. Even though over 40 years passed since the car stopped being made, the Pinto's legacy remains debated.

Besides preventable deaths and injuries from explosive rear-end collisions and resulting lawsuits, the Pinto and Ford Motor Company struggled to shed the bad image from refusing to fix or admit the dangerous design flaws before the car sold.

TimeandForbeshave both included the Pinto in articles about theworst carsof all time.Time, Popular Mechanics, andNBC News, meanwhile, have all listed the Pinto on lists of the mostsignificant product recallsin US history.

Many cite the Pinto's controversy in business ethics and tort reform case studies over the years.business ethicsThe car and the "Pinto memo" entered the cultural zeitgeist, creating jokes and references in television and film, such as therecall formula sceneinFight Club.